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9.1 AN OLD DOCTRINE AND AN OLD CHALLENGE
Truth-relativism and the attempt to refute truth-relativism have a long tradition.
Perhaps, the most famous argument against truth-relativism dates back to Plato’s
Theaetetus, where Plato tries to show that Protagoras’ thesis is self-refuting since
it cannot but be false if it is assumed to be true.¹However, in this kind of critical
discussion, truth-relativism has often been left undistinguished from subjectivism
or conceptual relativism. This way of understanding truth-relativism has bound
the validity of several arguments offered against it to depend on the acceptance, on
the part of the truth-relativist, of doctrines which are not essentially connected
to her theory, thus weakening the case against truth-relativism itself.² The
discussion about truth-relativism has also suffered from two further problems.
¹ Protagoras’ Thesis is the so-called Measure Doctrine:
there is nothing which is itself just one thing: nothing which you could rightly call anything or any
kind of thing. If you call a thing large, it will reveal itself as small, and if you call it heavy, it is liable
to appear as light, and so on with everything, because nothing is anything or any kind of thing.
What is is really true, is this: the things of which we naturally say that they ‘are’, are in process of
coming to be, as the result of movement and change and blending with one another. We are wrong
when we say they ‘are’, since nothing ever is, but everything is coming to be. (Theaetetus, 152d–e)
Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine is notoriously hard to interpret. It seems fair to say that it is a thesis
about the status of perceptual ascriptions: nothing is cold in itself, but only relatively to someone;
if we allow to use semantic ascent, one interpretation of this doctrine is that nothing is truly cold
in itself, rather the truth of ‘‘It is cold’’ is always relative to someone. Burnyeat has offered an
interesting reconstruction of Plato’s argument. According to him the conclusion of the argument,
which is divided in three steps, is that Protagoras’ doctrine is false for everyone, and thus for
Protagoras himself (see Burnyeat (1976b); see also Burnyeat (1976a) for an historical reconstruction
of how the argument has been understood in later ancient Greek philosophy).
² Davidson’s argument against relativism is based on the idea that the notion of conceptual
scheme is untenable (see Davidson (1974); see also Newton-Smith (1982)). For a recent discussion
of Davidson’s argument see Bilgrami (2002).
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The first problem is that the difficulty faced in properly stating the doctrine
has generated the widespread suspicion that the doctrine is essentially unclear,
if not incoherent.³ The second problem is that truth-relativism has been often
understood as a thesis claiming that all sentences⁴ of a language are true relative to
a parameter and false relative to another; such a strong formulation of relativism
faces the self-refutation charge since it is natural to object that the truth-relativist
thesis itself must then be false relative to some parameter.⁵
9.2 THE REVIVAL OF THE OLD DOCTRINE
Several proposals in the literature have recently revived truth-relativism trying to
make sense of the notion of relative truth and attempting to apply the doctrine
for solving different philosophical problems fruitfully.⁶
In this paper I will focus on John MacFarlane’s truth-relativist proposal,
since he has formulated a very detailed version of truth-relativism arguing
that several areas of discourse of English such as future contingents, aesthetic
judgements, judgements of taste, epistemic modals, and knowledge attributions
can be fruitfully analysed with the help of a truth-relativist semantics (see
MacFarlane 2003, 2005a). MacFarlane’s formulations of truth-relativism have
the merit of dispelling part of the objections which characterize the past literature
on relativism. MacFarlane’s relativism cannot be accused of unclarity, or even
³ See for example Meiland (1977), Newton-Smith (1982), Siegel’s critique to it (Siegel 1986)
and Swoyer (1982).
⁴ Strictly speaking, because of uncontroversial phenomena of context-sensitivity due to, for
example, indexical of expressions such as ‘‘I’’, ‘‘here’’ etc . . . , we should consider utterances of
sentences.
⁵ Of course, the attempt dates back to Plato. Recent discussions of this sort are, for example,
Hales (1997) and Bennigson (1999); see also Baghramian (2004, ch. 4). For a recent critique along
the traditional line see also Boghossian (2006) (especially ch. 4). In this latter work Boghossian tries
to argue against the relativization of facts, however his argument is not forceful against the recent
brand of truth-relativism that I will be considering in this paper. First, Boghossian argues against
global relativism (i.e. relativism about all the domains) whereas the authors I will be considering
have all argued for local relativism. Second, Boghossian seems to assume that truth-relativism is
committed to the idea that an utterance of ‘‘p’’ expresses the claim ‘‘relatively to X, it is the case
that p’’ (Boghossian (2006), 52), but this is rather what a contextualist would say. Notice also that
his regress argument is based on this assumption plus the further assumption that from a global
relativist point of view even the fact that ‘‘relatively to X, it is the case that p’’ expresses a claim
that needs further relativization—i.e. that claim ‘‘relatively to X, it is the case that relatively to X,
it is the case that p’’ which itself expresses a more complex proposition, and so on; the relativist
is eventually committed to the idea that the utterance of ‘‘p’’ expresses an infinitary proposition
‘‘that we can neither express nor understand’’ (Boghossian (2006), 56). However, notice that even
the standard contextualist is not committed to this further assumption: the context fixes what is
said by the utterance and nothing can change this fact; nor is the truth-relativist committed to this
idea (even though she could be committed to the idea that what is said is relative to the context of
assessment of the utterance; see in this volume Cappelen 2008).
⁶ See Egan et al. (2004), Egan (2006), Kölbel (2002), Kölbel (2003), Lasersohn (2005),
MacFarlane (2003), MacFarlane (2005b), and Richard (2004).
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of using incoherent notions, since he has advanced his proposal providing a
detailed compositional semantics and a definition of relative truth.⁷ According
to MacFarlane, an appropriate semantics should not only use the relativization
to the context in which the act of acceptance is performed (e.g. the context
of use of a sentence in the case of assertion), but also to the context in which
the truth-value of the sentence is assessed.⁸ The accuracy of acceptance (where
acceptance can be a mental act such as a belief or a speech act such as assertion)
of a proposition is relative to the assessor’s context: the accuracy of my belief that
cappuccino tastes better than espresso is relative to the standard of taste of whom
is assessing my stance. More precisely:
(Relative Accuracy) An acceptance (rejection) of a proposition on matters
of taste p relative to context of use CU is accurate relatively to context
of assessment CA if and only if p is true relative to the circumstances
<WCU , SCA> where WCU is the world of CU and SCA is the standard of
taste of the assessor at CA.⁹
The doctrine of truth-relativism amounts to the claim that, in the language
in question, there is at least one assessment-sensitive sentence, i.e. a sentence that,
used in a certain context, expresses a proposition which can be correctly assessed
in two different ways in two contexts of assessment.¹⁰
Since the accuracy of acceptance (or rejection) is relative due to the assessment-
relativity of propositions accepted (or rejected) in certain contexts, the norms
governing our practice of accepting (and rejecting) need a specific formulation.
In fact, the traditional idea of conceiving, for example, truth as the aim of
assertion must either be qualified (e.g. to assert ‘‘p’’ is to aim to its truth relatively
to the assertor’s assessment context) or given up. According to MacFarlane the
relativist must choose the latter option.¹¹ Instead of conceiving acceptance as
aiming at the truth, we must think of acceptance as a commitment to the truth
of the proposition accepted. For example, consider the case of assertion: the
⁷ I will base the exposition of MacFarlane’s theory on his latest statement of his theory to be
found in MacFarlane (2007).
⁸ Relativism has to be distinguished from contextualism according to which the same sentence
type uttered in two different contexts can have different truth-values since it comes to express two
different propositions. Here I leave aside the subtle issues connected to the esoteric (but crucial)
distinction between relativism and non-indexical contextualism (see MacFarlane (2007: 26) and,
more extensively, MacFarlane (forthcoming)).
⁹ MacFarlane (2007: 26).
¹⁰ Since the notion of acceptance includes both the act of asserting and the act of believing, the
existence of an assessment-sensitive belief is also sufficient for the correctness of truth-relativism.
Whether or not there is a priority of the linguistic formulation of truth-relativism over the mental
formulation or vice versa is an issue that can be left open here.
¹¹ There is no space in this paper for a discussion of reason for or against the ‘‘aiming conception’’
of acceptance (for MacFarlane’s discussion see MacFarlane (2005b: 328–37), MacFarlane (2007:
§ 5). For critiques to the possibility of making sense of the aiming conception from a relativist
standpoint see Evans (1979) and Percival (1994)). For the sake of the argument I will assume
MacFarlane’s characterization of the norms governing acceptance of a proposition.
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commitment undertaken in asserting a proposition ‘‘is commitment to meeting
all legitimate challenges to the accuracy of one’s assertion, and to withdrawing
the assertion (disavowing the commitment) if one cannot do so’’ (MacFarlane
(2007: 28)). The picture, borrowed by the works of Robert Brandom (Brandom
1994), is that acceptance is a move in the game of giving and asking for reasons,
a game disciplined by several rules which define the content of the commitment
undertaken by each of the moves. In particular, one of these rules dictates that a
speaker of a language is committed to justify, if challenged, the proposition she
has asserted:
(Relative Assertion 1) In asserting that p at the context C1, one commits
oneself to withdrawing the assertion in any future context C2, if p is shown
to be untrue relative to context of use C1 and context of assessment C2.¹²
(Relative Assertion 2) In asserting that p at the context C1, one commits
oneself to justifying the assertion when the assertion is appropriately
challenged. To justify the assertion in a context C2 is to provide grounds
for the truth of p relative to context of use C1 and context of assessment C2.
where C2 is the context of assessment in which ‘‘the assertor is evaluating the
putative refutation’’ (MacFarlane (2005b: 336)). In other words, if the assertor
recognizes in a later context that what she asserted is untrue or unjustified, she
is committed to retract her assertion on the pain of either being dishonest or of
misunderstanding the practice of assertion.
Consider a dispute over the goodness in taste of cappuccino. It is well known
that in accounting for the intuition that the dispute is faultless we are faced with
a dilemma: either you go with the hard-core objectivist solution holding that one
of the disputants is right and the other is wrong with the drawback that it is a
mystery why both disputants think they are right and that you are committed to
a dubious rampant realist metaphysics of the property of the goodness of taste
of cappuccino; or you go with the contextualist holding that both disputants
are right since each of them actually expresses something as ‘‘cappuccino tastes
good (or bad) for me’’, but the drawback is then that it leaves unexplained why
they believe disagreeing (unless an error theory about the semantics of these
expressions is postulated for the speakers of the language).¹³
MacFarlane’s solution to this puzzle is that since the notion of accuracy is
relative to assessment-contexts—i.e. it is a perspectival notion—each of the
disputants is right in his own acceptance and in believing that the other is
wrong. Given that a necessary condition for disagreement is that not both of the
parties can be accurate and that since from both of the contexts of assessment
the respective opponent’s acceptance comes out as inaccurate, the perspectival
¹² MacFarlane also states another principle regarding assertion (MacFarlane (2005b: 336–37)).
I will consider only Relative Assertion 1 and 2 because they are relevant for my argument.
¹³ For a statement of this dilemma see Wright (2006: 38–40) and MacFarlane (2007: 18–21).
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notion of accuracy gives the right result even if the notion of disagreement is
itself perspectival:
(Relative Disagreement) Two parties disagree relatively to the context of
assessment CA if (a) there is a proposition that one party accepts and the
other rejects, and (b) acceptance and rejection cannot be both accurate (as
assessed from CA)
Does Relative Disagreement give also a sufficient condition for disagreement?
MacFarlane himself has highlighted difficulties with regards to the sufficiency
condition: given that there are temporal propositions, any acceptance or rejections
of them would count as a disagreement (MacFarlane (2007), § 3). In Section 8.1
I will argue that the relativist proposal does not take into consideration the
point of the disagreement which is to reach an agreement by ratiocinative means
(e.g. by means of reasoning or by inspecting the relevant facts). Moreover in
Section 8.2 I will argue that ignoring this feature commits the relativist to an
ignorance theory for her proposal.
9 .3 THE REVIVAL OF THE OLD CHALLENGE
Notice that this formulation of truth-relativism evades the classical charge of self-
refutation since it does not imply that every utterance is assessment-sensitive. The
truth-relativist is not thus committed to acknowledge that even the truth-relativist
thesis is false in respect of some context of assessment.¹⁴
Still, it might be thought that the truth-relativist is in trouble anyway because
of a different version of self-refutation. Suppose that two speakers take opposite
stances on a given assessment-sensitive proposition p (one believes that it is true
and the other believes that it is false). If the truth-relativist believes that her
doctrine can be applied to the case in question—i.e. if she believes that the
proposition in question is assessment-sensitive—how can she take a view on this
proposition since she believes knowing that the proposition is true relatively to a
context of assessment and false relatively to another context of assessment? How
can she rationally privilege one of the two contexts once she believes that both can
correctly determine the truth-value of the proposition in two incompatible ways?
One might think that the relativist should either abstain from any judgement
on the relevant proposition or she must give up the idea that the proposition is
assessment-sensitive.
¹⁴ Moreover the distinction between object language and metalanguage can be used to deflect
the charge of self-refutation arguing that the truth-relativist thesis is formulated in a metalanguage
which is ‘‘devoid of assessment sensitivity’’ (MacFarlane (2005b): 338 n. 19)—i.e. a language where
no proposition expressed by an utterance of its sentences has a truth-value which varies with the
context of assessment.
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Such a conclusion is certainly odd because it seems to imply that the
attitude of belief towards a proposition is constrained by whether or not it
is believed that the proposition is assessment-sensitive: either (i) it is believed
that the proposition is assessment-sensitive without, at the same time, holding
any opinion about the proposition in question, or (ii) it is a belief held
about the proposition without accepting that the proposition is assessment-
sensitive.
In the following I will develop this line of argument in detail. In Section 4
I will introduce a toy example in order to test the truth-relativist proposal in
relation to disputes in matter of taste.¹⁵ In Sections 5, 6, and 7 I will develop
three lines of argument which aim to show that acceptance of the truth-relativism
in a context of a dispute has problematic consequences. Though I will argue that
none of these arguments succeeds in showing that there is a real problem for
truth-relativism, these arguments hint at a real problem for the truth-relativist.
The problem will be stated in Section 8.
9 .4 A SIMPLE SCENARIO
Scene 1 Ann: (after sipping cappuccino from a mug) This cappuccino tastes
good! Mary: (after tasting the cappuccino from the same mug) No, it is horrible!
Scene 2 Linda, a truth-relativist about taste, joins the party and, listening to
the conversation, explains the doctrine of truth-relativism to Ann and Mary.
Ann and Mary start discussing about truth-relativism and they are eventually
persuaded that truth-relativism is the best explanation of the intuition of faultless
disagreement in matters of taste.
9 .5 FIRST ATTEMPT
Consider now the scenario including Scenes 1 and 2 where Ann and Mary,
after disputing about the taste of the cappuccino, are persuaded by Linda to go
relativist. In such a scenario they believe that truth-relativism is the true doctrine
in matters of taste, in other words they believe they grasp now the correct
truth-conditions of their assertions. Let’s call the proposition that cappuccino
tastes good cappuccino. Given their new belief, they realize that the accuracy of
their acceptance (rejection) of cappuccino is perspectival:
(Relative Ann) Ann’s acceptance of cappuccino relative to her context of use
(CAnn) is accurate relative to an assessor context CA if and only if cappuccino is
¹⁵ Kölbel (2002), Lasersohn (2005) and MacFarlane (2007) have argued that truth-relativism
can be applied to these disputes.
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true relative to the circumstances <WCAnn , SCAnn> whereWCU is the world
of CAnn and SCA is the standard of taste of the assessor at C
(RelativeMary)Mary’s rejection of cappuccino relative to her context of use
(CMary) is accurate relative to an assessor context CA if and only if cappuccino
is true relative to the circumstances<WCMary , SCA> whereWCU is the world
of CMary and SCA is the standard of taste of the assessor at CA
Ann and Mary believe the truth-relativist doctrine, but can they coherently
express that this dispute is faultless while at the same time being engaged in the
dispute? Can Ann believe that the dispute between her and Mary is without fault
even though she disagrees with Mary? To do this, she has to claim that from the
context of assessment CAnn, cappuccino is true and that from the context of
assessment CMary cappuccino is false:
(Relative Cappuccino) • cappuccino
is true relative to the circumstances <WCAnn ,
SCAnn> where WCU is the world of CAnn and
SCAnn is the standard of taste of the assessor at
CAnn
• cappuccino
is false relative to the circumstances <WCMary ,
SCMary> where WCU is the world of CMary and
SCMary is the standard of taste of the assessor at
CMary
Relative Cappuccino is meant to express the thought that there is a genuine
case of faultless disagreement: there are two assessment contexts where the same
proposition is correctly evaluated with two contradictory semantic values—i.e.
as true in one context and as false in the other context.
According to Relative Assertion 1, an assertion of Relative Cappuccino involves
a commitment to withdraw the assertion in any future context, if in this context
she recognizes that what she asserted is shown untrue. Can Ann and Mary keep
the commitment undertaken by asserting and denying in their respective contexts
cappuccino after asserting Relative Cappuccino?
The question is whether, for example, Ann is bound to reject cappuccino
after having asserted Relative Cappuccino. After all, it might be suggested, since
Ann accepts Relative Cappuccino she thereby recognizes that Mary has accurately
rejected a false proposition from her point of view. And if this is the case,
why can’t this latter fact count as a piece of conclusive evidence against the
commitment undertaken in her previous assertion of cappuccino?
The careful reader has probably already noted that this reasoning contains
two errors: (1) remember that Ann believes that accuracy is perspectival, so
she can recognize that Mary has accurately rejected cappuccino only if, for
example, she would be capable of deferring to Mary’s standard and so far
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nothing has been said about the possibility of this mechanism of deference; (2)
even granting that there is such a mechanism of deference, Relative Assertion
1 dictates to Ann rejecting her assertion of cappuccino only if cappuccino is
untrue relatively to her standard of taste (selected by her context of assessment),
but Ann’s actual standard of taste is different from her deferred standard
of taste.
In this sense, the charge of pragmatic self-refutation is formally avoided since
the belief in the truth-relativist doctrine does not automatically cut the grounds
to belief in cappuccino.
9 .6 SECOND ATTEMPT
Itmight be thought that it is incoherent to believe that cappuccino is assessment-
sensitive when we consider a neutral perspective on the matter. Let’s suppose
that Linda’s context of assessment (CLinda) is neutral on the dispute between Ann
and Mary.¹⁶
Now, consider Scene 1 only where Ann and Mary still do not know anything
about truth-relativism, and let’s suppose that Linda is secretly listening to
their discussion. If the truth-relativist believes that there is a genuine faultless
disagreement between Mary and Ann, she would presumably hold that both
are correct and that their assertions are perfectly justified from their respective
contexts of assessment. Since Ann and Mary have, from Linda’s perspective, a
true justified belief it seems natural to say that Linda believes that Ann and Mary
are knowledgeable with respect to cappuccino.¹⁷Now, since the truth-relativist’s
perspective (i.e. Linda’s perspective) is neutral with respect to cappuccino, Linda,
the truth-relativist, should be accurate, relative to her context of assessment, in
accepting the following propositions:
(1) that Ann knows that cappuccino
(2) that Mary knows that not-cappuccino¹⁸
Presumably, the truth-relativist version of factivity would be expressed saying
that if a knowledge ascription is true relative to a context of assessment, the
embedded sentence is true relative to the same context of assessment. Given the
assumption that Linda’s acceptance of previous knowledge ascriptions is accurate,
¹⁶ The following argument is an adaptation of an argument advanced by Jason Stanley in relation
to the truth-relativist analysis of knowledge-ascriptions (see Stanley (2005), 146). Stanley believes
that the argument, together with other two arguments, shows that the truth-relativist cannot give
any coherent formulation of factivity. My use of the argument is different, since I start from the
assumption that there is a natural formulation of factivity for the truth-relativist, but that this
formulation of factivity jeopardizes the very idea of a neutral perspective.
¹⁷ Putting aside Gettier-style worries.
¹⁸ Where, of course, not-cappuccino is the negation of cappuccino.
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it follows that she is committed to inconsistent propositions.¹⁹,²⁰ However, it is
unclear why the truth-relativist should be committed to the existence of a neutral
perspective. On the contrary, assuming bivalence, there are reasons to think the
contrary. What does it mean to be neutral about a proposition for a context of
assessment? On an epistemic reading of neutrality, to be neutral with respect
to a proposition means to be agnostic about the proposition. But since we are
dealing here with truth-relativism, the idea is rather that a certain perspective
does not commit to the truth or falsity of a certain proposition. However, while
the absence of commitment in the epistemic sense amounts to the suspension
of judgement, in the alethic case the analogous situation would be that the
proposition is neither true nor false. But in this case it is the burden of the
objector to justify the claim that for every assessment-sensitive proposition there
is a context of assessment in relation to which the proposition is neither true
nor false. Why should bivalence fail just because there must be such a neutral
perspective?²¹ The truth-relativist might also add that she could make sense of
the idea of a neutral perspective by means of a metalanguage which is devoid of
assessment sensitivity.
¹⁹ To express more precisely the worry, the proposal amounts to say that acceptance of the
relevant knowledge ascriptions is accurate relatively to an assessment context CA just in case:
(3) relatively to the context of assessment CLinda, the proposition that Ann knows that cappuccino
is true relative to the circumstances<WCAnn , SCAnn> whereWCU is the world of CAnn and SCAnn
is the standard of taste of the assessor at CAnn
(4) relatively to the context of assessment CLinda, the proposition that Mary knows that not-
cappuccino is true to the circumstances <WCMary , SCMary> where WCU is the world of CMary
and SCMary is the standard of taste of the assessor at CMary
—in other words CLinda features as an idle wheel. The aforementioned truth-conditions amount
to the claim that knowledge ascriptions do not inherit assessment-sensitivity from the embedded
propositions.
Given now the following rule of factivity of knowledge:
(Relative Factivity) from relatively to the context of assessment CA, the proposition
that x knows cappuccino is true to the circumstances
<WCx , SCx> where WCU is the world of Cx and SCx is the
standard of taste of the assessor at Cx
infer relatively to the context of assessment CA, cappuccino is
true to the circumstances <WCx , SCA> where WCU is the
world of Cx and SCA is the standard of taste of the assessor
at CA
Linda’s context of assessment is bound to evaluate cappuccino as both true and false.
²⁰ The previous footnote is symptomatic of the fact that a proposition p is assessment-sensitive
if and only if the proposition that is known that p is assessment-sensitive. Suppose that p is true at
C1 and that not-p is true at C2, then ¬K¬p is true at C1 and ¬Kp is true at C2. If we assume that
in both contexts there is a subject who has knowledge of p, then Kp is assessment-sensitive. The
other direction is straightforward: suppose that Kp is assessment-sensitive, then two subjects know,
respectively, that p and that ¬p. By Relative Factivity p is assessment-sensitive (I am indebted for
this point to Dan Lo´pez De Sa).
²¹ Asssuming here that we are dealing only with propositions for which the truth-relativist
analysis clearly does not require the failure of bivalence.
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Finally, the truth-relativist might opt to state the rule of factivity by selecting
the standard of assessment of the ascribee of the knowledge claim, hence avoiding
that Linda contradicts herself.²²
9.7 THIRD ATTEMPT
It might be argued that cappuccino cannot be believed because from the point
of view of the truth-relativist semantics it is an incomplete entity which cannot
be the object of any belief.²³
A paradigmatic example of an incomplete semantic entity which cannot fulfil
the role of a proposition is the propositional function expressed by ‘‘I am happy’’
when this sentence is just written on a blackboard in a class of English language.
The sentence expresses something, but it is something we cannot accept or
reject.²⁴
Consider now the following argument in relation to a scenario which includes
Scenes 1 and 2.
1 (1) According to truth-relativism about matters of taste, it is the
case that cappuccino is true relative to the circumstances
<WCAnn , SCAnn> whereWCAnn is the world of CAnn and SCAnn
is the standard of taste of the assessor at CAnn;
(Ass.)
(2) Define cappuccino+ as the proposition featuring in the
that-clause of (1)
(Def.)
1 (3) cappuccino+ has absolute truth-conditions (i.e. it is not
assessment-sensitive): cappuccino+ is true if and only if
cappuccino is true relative to the circumstances <WCAnn ,
SCAnn> where WCAnn is the world of CAnn and SCAnn is the
standard of taste of the assessor at CAnn;²⁵
(1,2)
1 (4) cappuccino+ is a different entity from cappuccino; (1,3)
Given scenes 1 and 2, Ann believes cappuccino because of her personal taste
and furthermore she believes cappuccino+ because she has been persuaded by
Linda to believe truth-relativism, hence:
²² However, this new rule of factivity would fail to sanction, by conditional introduction, the
truth relative to any standard of assessment Kp ⊃ p which is plausibly an a priori truth.
²³ The following is an adaptation of Zimmerman’s argument (Zimmerman 2006), Egan raises a
similar problem in relation to assertion (Egan 2006).
²⁴ Zimmerman says that such an incomplete semantic entity is something that we cannot ‘‘weigh
the reasons for and against thinking that it is true’’ (Zimmerman 2006).
²⁵ This fact should not be given for granted. There are areas of discourse where it is arguable,
once truth-relativism is assumed to be the correct semantic theory, that truth-relativism holds also
for higher-orders (see in this volume Wright (2008: § 4) and Moruzzi and Wright (forthcoming)).
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5 (5) Ann believes cappuccino and cappuccino+; (Ass.)
6 (6) If a proposition is assessment-sensitive, it cannot be con-
sidered independently from a context of assessment (i.e. it
cannot be entertained as having absolute truth-conditions;
analogy with ‘I am happy’);
(Ass.)
1,6 (7) Ann cannot believe cappuccino, she can only believe
cappuccino+;
(1,6)
1,5,6 (8) Contradiction. (5,7)
Thus the conclusion is that cappuccino fails to have the cognitive role that
content should have, i.e. being the object of belief. If the above argument were
sound, it would establish the disastrous result that semantics postulates contents
which cannot be believed.
Of course the crucial step of the argument is line 6, but why should we assume
that the truth-relativity of a proposition must compromise the cognitive role
of being object of belief? The obvious problem with this argument is that it
assumes, without further argument, that the truth-relativity of a semantic entity
forbids that this entity can be the object of a belief with the notable exception
of the relativity to possible worlds: only indexical propositions (characters), tensed
propositions, and relativist propositions are propositional functions, and thus,
being incomplete, they cannot be believed.²⁶
In the following section I will offer a better argument for the idea that an
assessment-sensitive proposition cannot be the object of belief.
9 .8 FOURTH ATTEMPT
Remember that the relativization of the accuracy of acceptance of a proposition
(e.g. of the correctness of the assertion) does not leave room for the idea that the
accuracy of the acceptance and rejection of cappuccino is absolute.²⁷
In the following I will argue that the perspectival notion of accuracy is
unsatisfactory because: (1) it fails to explain why, in cases such as Ann’s and
Mary’s dispute over cappuccino, the parties involved behave as if they really
disagree over the truth of the proposition in question—i.e. as if they were
genuinely engaged in a dispute; (2) if Mary and Ann believe the truth-relativist
story, they are rationally compelled to abstain from disputing over cappuccino.
²⁶ The style of the argument reminds of Mark Richard’s famous argument against temporalism
(see Richard 1981).
²⁷ A different notion of accuracy where the context of assessment does not play a role in evaluating
the accuracy of a certain acceptance could allow this (see the ‘‘use-centric notion of accuracy’’ in
MacFarlane (2007: § 4.1)).
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To control the factors involved in the following arguments, I will argue in
two phases: first I will consider only Scene 1 of Simple Scenario where it is not
assumed that the speakers know the truth-relativist semantics, then I will extend
the scenario to Scene 2 where this assumption is in play.
To be clear about the example, let us put aside any possible difference between
Ann and Mary in their expertise on the art of cappuccino-making,²⁸ and let us
suppose also that the application of their standards does not involve, whatever
that might mean, an error—i.e. no cognitive shortcoming is involved.
9.8.1 Argument Limited to Scene 1: A Problem of Explanation
Let us ask howAnn can recognizeMary’s ground for the rejection of cappuccino.
From Ann’s perspective, cappuccino is true andMary’s rejection of cappuccino
is not accurate.²⁹ Now, the problem is not that for this latter reason Mary is at
fault. After all, if accuracy is perspectival so is the notion of fault. Alternatively,
we could also decide to use ‘‘fault’’ just in case the proposition asserted is false
relative to the standard of the assertor; in this sense Ann could assert that Mary
is not at fault. But this is just a quibble. Rather, the problem arises in connection
with the point of the disagreement between Mary and Ann.
According to Relative Assertion 2 (see above § 2) acceptance of a proposition
involves a commitment to provide a defence if it is challenged from some context
of assessment. To what extent can we explain the dispute over cappuccino on
this base? If Mary’s challenge to Ann cannot be met in principle unless Ann
changes her standard of taste, how can this explain the behaviour of Ann and
Mary?
Compare the truth-relativist way of representing the accuracy of Mary’s
rejection with a situation where Mary has rejected cappuccino because of a piece
of evidence, unknown to everyone except to whom has decided to join her in
the rejection.³⁰ In such a situation to what extent could Mary challenge Ann’s
belief about cappuccino if the only way to show the reasons for her disbelief
would be to change her mind? Of course, Mary’s challenge might be based on
issues accessible also to Ann such as, for example, the fact that the cappuccino is
bitter; but while for Mary this would count as a reason for disliking cappuccino,
for Ann it would count as the opposite; after such a move they would find
themselves in the same situation as before: Mary would say ‘‘But don’t you feel
how it is bitter?!’’ and Ann would reply ‘‘Exactly!’’ and here the game of giving
²⁸ See contra in this volume Iacona (2008) for the idea that there is no such thing as a dispute
involving faultless disagreement when the disputants have the same level of expertise.
²⁹ Given that Ann and Mary’s world is the same one and that no further parameter relative to
circumstances of use is relevant for the relativist, I omit any reference to circumstances of evaluation
in the following.
³⁰ The analogy is derived from a similar example in Rosenkranz (2008).
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and criticizing reasons would have no point, there would simply be nothing more
to do.³¹
9.8.1.1 First Counter-objection: stalemate is the appropriate prediction
It could be replied that nothing of what I have said is problematic, in fact this
is exactly the kind of stalemate in which disputes of taste typically end. Hence,
contrary to my allegations, the relativist predicts exactly what has to be predicted.
Reply: what is problematic is to explain these kind of conversations by means
of the idea of challenges and defences: how can the appeal to challenges based on
standards which are different from the standards of who is challenged describe
such behaviours? What is the point of such challenges if in principle they cannot
be met? Wouldn’t it be more appropriate to describe these situations just as
expressions of our own personal preferences instead of commitments which are
in principle right and challenges which are unanswerable?
9.8.1.2 Second Counter-objection: controversy just feels uncomfortable
MacFarlane’s reply to the latter questions is that our stubborn attitude to
challenge in these extreme circumstances is useful also ‘‘to foster coordination of
contexts [because we] have an interest in sharing standards of taste [ . . . ] with
those around us’’ (MacFarlane (2007), 30). But why is it so? Because, MacFarlane
suggests, controversy just feels uncomfortable in itself, and this is just a datum of
human nature.³²
Reply: this move is explanatorily unsatisfactory: the perspectival notion of
accuracy (RelativeAccuracy) and the idea of characterizing assertion on the basis of
a commitment governed by certain rules (Relative Assertion 1 and 2) were meant
to provide an explanation of the puzzling phenomenon of faultless disagreement.
The advertised advantage of the relativist proposal was that, whereas the hard-
core objectivist and the contextualist are at odds in making sense, respectively,
of faultlessness and disagreement, the relativist could explain both features. But
it turns out now that the relativist package explains this phenomenon only as
long as we assume as a brute fact that the behaviour of human agents exhibited
in dispute of matters of taste is recalcitrant to any explanation on the basis of the
game of asking and giving reasons—i.e. recalcitrant to the relativist’s explanans!
9.8.1.3 Third Counter-objection: a challenge is an invitation to experiment
A way to make sense of the idea of challenges and defences in a truth-relativist
scenario could be of conceiving a challenge to the assertion of ‘‘Cappuccino does
not taste good’’ as an invitation to taste cappuccino in order to get used to its
³¹ A very similar point is made in Moltmann (forthcoming), § 2.2.1.
³² MacFarlane refers here to Gibbard (1990) according to whom there is an evolutionary
explanation of this fact.
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peculiar flavour in the long run; getting used to cappuccino would thus put you
in a position to appreciate it properly.³³
Reply: this interpretation would leave anyway unintelligible a dispute between
people who have been tasting cappuccino for a relevantly long period who
nonetheless continue to disagree.
9.8.1.4 Fourth Counter-objection: disagreement is independent from its
manifestation
It might be protested that the above line of reasoning ties the conditions for
the existence of a disagreement with conditions relative to the manifestability of
the disagreement: whether or not the point of a dispute is to reach agreement
by ratiocinative means (e.g. by means of reasoning or by inspecting the relevant
facts), a disagreement requires just the expression of opposite attitudes (i.e.
acceptance and rejection) towards a certain proposition. There can be irresolvable
disagreements. After all, pace verificationism, we can certainly dispute over
unknowable propositions and hence we have cases of irresolvable disputes
already. The fact that the conflicting attitudes of Ann and Mary are expression
of an irresolvable conflict does not undermine the fact that they are disagreeing;
if Ann or Mary change their standards, the dispute can be felicitously solved and
there can be convergence of opinions; if they stick to their different standards,
they attain to nothing. If the latter happens, the insolubility of the dispute sheds
light on the nature of the attitudes involved: they are not beliefs which we are
disposed to abandon by ratiocinative means, they are rather tokens of a different
type of attitude, e.g. personal preferences, a form of acceptance which is different
from, for example, beliefs about the physical properties of the world.³⁴
Reply: first, it is suspect to proliferate types of attitudes; how many types of
acceptance are there? Can cappuccino be accepted in different ways in a dispute?
If not, how can we describe the case of someone who, after disputing, decides
to change her mind? Would she be in error—would she have misunderstood
the nature of her own attitude? Or, if she were not in error, what would be the
role of the ratiocinative means she has putatively employed in the change of her
mind given that this attitude is by definition irresolvable by these means? If, on
the other hand, cappuccino can be accepted in different ways in a dispute, what
are the roles of these different attitudes in the dynamic of the dispute? Consider
the case of someone believing in creationism for purely religious reasons who is
involved in a debate with a biologist who believes, because of a complex scientific
enquiry, in evolutionism; there is a sense in which they are talking past each
other since the reasons presented by one are, in principle, completely irrelevant
³³ I owe this objection to Marco Santambrogio.
³⁴ I have elaborated this objection on the basis of remarks made by Annalisa Coliva. The
underlying idea is that acceptance of a proposition can come in different sorts as Wittgenstein
already hinted in On Certainty.
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to the other. If a dispute over cappuccino can be of this latter sort, in what
sense are they disputing given that they appeal to different epistemic norms? Can
the very same person change her way of acceptance (e.g. from dogmatist mode
of acceptance to non-dogmatist mode) and why and how can it happen? Until
these questions are answered the proposal looks rather mysterious.
Second, the case of unknowable propositions is not relevant since what is at
stake is not the possibility for the dispute to be solved, rather it is the normative
requirement that the disputants should aim to cooperate to solve the problem
they are disputing on.³⁵
9.8.1.5 Conclusion of the argument limited to Scene 1
In conclusion, it remains a mystery whyMary challenges Ann since any challenge
cannot but be won by the challenger and, symmetrically, it is a mystery why
Ann asserts cappuccino since her acceptance is systematically defeated byMary’s
challenge. MacFarlane’s reply is that this is so because it is a brute fact of human
psychology, but I find this reply deeply unsatisfactory.
9.8.2 Argument Extended to Scene 2: Suspension of Judgement
Let us put this explanatory problem aside. After all, our doubts could be assuaged
by the well-known (and philosophically frustrating) thought that we can’t ask
for reasons ad infinitum. At a certain point we reach the bedrock. Ann and Mary
have simply reached, so to say, their personal bedrock for what counts as a good
cappuccino.
Be that as it may, let us move to Scene 2 where Ann and Mary come to
believe the truth-relativist story about cappuccino. I will argue that it is then
impossible for the truth-relativist to make sense of the rationality of Ann’s and
Mary’s respective opinions.
Ann and Mary know that acceptance of a proposition involves a commitment
to provide a defence if challenged from some context of assessment. To what
extent would they dispute about cappuccino once informed of this fact?
Mary knows that her challenge cannot be met in principle unless Ann changes
her standard of taste, and since Ann knows this as well, there is no point in
arguing about cappuccino.
9.8.2.1 First Counter-Objection: silence is appropriate
Again it could be replied that this kind of stalemate is the usual situation in the
disputes of taste.
Reply: notice that once we assume knowledge of the truth-relativist doctrine,
silence would always be the rational way to act. In fact, if assertion is understood
³⁵ For a similar point see Price (2003).
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in the context of such a dispute as an action undertaking a commitment to face
challenges from other perspectives, no challenge can make sense if grounded on
a different assessment context, thus the only rational thing to do is to remain
silent and not even start disputing. Once Ann and Mary know that there is
no point in issuing challenges and replying to them in any other way than
persuading the other to stop using her own standard, they would simply cease
discussing.
9.8.2.2 Second Counter-Objection: truth-relativism does not require
rationality
It might be objected that it is not part of the truth-relativist thesis that speakers
have to be rational.³⁶
Reply: it is a startling and embarrassing consequence that the truth-relativist
analysis of faultless disagreement is at odds with the idea that the disputing
behaviour of speakers aware of the semantics of their language is rational.
Moreover notice that if belief, which is a type of acceptance of a proposition,
amounts to being prepared to issue and face such challenges, then the fact that
Mary and Ann see no point in issuing challenges and replying to them amounts
to the fact that they simply would stop believing anything about cappuccino.
9.8.2.3 Conclusion of the argument extended to Scene 2
In conclusion, Ann and Mary should simply remain silent and unopinionated
about cappuccino. Hence a dispute can take place only insofar as the truth-
relativist story is ignored by the speakers. The truth-relativist is committed to an
ignorance theory if she does not want to rule out a prori the rationality of disputes
of taste. Thus the truth-relativist would fail to part company with contextualist
approaches which analyse ‘‘It tastes good’’ as an elliptical expression meaning ‘‘It
tastes good to me’’, since also these latter theories are committed to an ignorance
theory if they want to save the rationality of a dispute.
9 .9 CONCLUSION
I have considered four arguments against the idea that assessment-sensitive
propositions can represent the right entities that we believe in cases such as
controversies in matters of taste. Though the first three arguments have been
found to be faulty, they have collectively pointed to an idea developed in the
fourth argument. The conclusion of this latter argument is that the truth-relativist
story fails to explain why we behave as we actually behave when we are involved
in disputes of matters of taste, and that this story entails that we should not
³⁶ I owe this objection to Richard Dietz.
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behave as we actually behave if we were aware of the correct semantics of our
language.
Let me close with two final notes. I have chosen the case of disputes of taste
since it is a standard case for accounting for the puzzle of faultless disagreement,
but I do not think that the points I have made are limited to this area of
discourse. Secondly, the arguments presented in the preceding sections are
specifically designed against MacFarlane’s version of truth-relativism, as it is
presently the most developed proposal available. My claim that truth-relativism
actually risks losing its advantages over the other positions (mainly contextualism)
in respecting the putative idea that there is a real disagreement between opposite
parties in matters of taste is thus limited toMacFarlane’s theory. However, it may
still be the case that other versions of relativism—yet to be developed—would
be better off. These other versions could for example develop different notions
of acceptance and interplay between the normative rules that govern them.
However, the details of these possible developments and changes will have to be
investigated and assessed on another occasion.³⁷
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